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PLEADING STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
The writ of habeas corpus1 is a procedural device for subjecting execu-
tive, judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny.2 To be
precise, the writ itself only tells a custodian, "You have a person in your
possession, produce him before the court and show why you hold him in
custody in restraint of his liberty."'3  Therefore, when a federal court grants
the writ of habeas corpus, this does not mean that it is granting the relief
requested by the petitioner, but only that it will consider granting the ap.
propriate form of relief.
The history of the writ is closely associated with the growth of funda-
mental rights of personal liberty, for the root principle of the writ is that
in a civilized society government must always be accountable to the judi-
ciary for a person's imprisonment.4  If the imprisonment cannot be shown
to conform with the constitutional requirements of due process, such as
when the evidence used against the petitioner was obtained by an illegal
search and seizure, the individual is entitled to his immediate release.5
In habeas corpus proceedings, the denial of a fair hearing by the trial court
is not established by proving merely that the decision was wrong.0 In
other words, the petitioner's guilt or innocence is not a vital consideration
in determining whether habeas corpus relief should be available.
The writ is available by statute in only five different situations. It can-
not extend to a prisoner unless he is either in the custody of the federal
government,8 he is in the custody of a state for some act done pursuant to
federal authority,9 he is in custody in violation of federal law,10 he is a for-
eign citizen in custody for an act done under color of authority from any
1 "Habeas corpus" is the name given to a variety of writs having the purpose of bringing
a party before a court or judge. In common usage, wherever the words "habeas corpus" stand
alone, they are understood to mean the "great writ" of habeas corpus ad subjudiciendtm. For
a concise discussion of the history of the writ, see Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus A Protean Writ
and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1948).
2 Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968).
3 Brooks v. Texas, 256 F. Supp. 807, 808 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
4 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
5 Id.; Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 236 (1953).
OTisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 133 (1924).
For a discussion of why the law should be otherwise, see Kaufman v. United States, 394
U.S. 217, 235-36 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. CHI,
L. REV. 142 (1970).
8 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (1) (1970). Because of § 2255 of the Judicial Code, this provision
is of little importance except in non-criminal cases. See, e.g., Rowoldt v. Perfitto, 355 U.S.
115 (1957).
9 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (2) (1970). This condition is of small practical importance be-
cau6e agents of the federal government have the right under §§ 1442 and 1442a of the Judicial
Code to remove the state prosecutions.
1028 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1970). As for people in custody pursuant to a judgment of
a state court, § 2254(a) of the Judicial Code provides that a federal judge shall entertain their
applications for the writ of habeas corpus only on this ground.
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foreign state and international law is involved," or it is necessary to bring
him into court to testify for trial.12  Consequently, the federal court's ju-
risdiction to pass on an application for the writ depends upon the peti-
tioner somehow being "in custody." This is required not only by the re-
peated references in the statute, but also by the history of the writ."3
Habeas corpus has been characterized by many as a collateral attack
on a judgment of conviction, 4 but the use of the writ has not been solely
restricted to situations in which the petitioner is in jail. The Supreme
Court has recognized that "besides physical imprisonment, there are other
restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally,
which have been thought sufficient in the English speaking world to sup-
port the issuance of habeas corpus."' 5 Besides being applicable to those
in confinement under civil and criminal process, the writ has been held ap-
plicable to "[w]ives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the
proper parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private
individuals, as in a madhouse, as well as those under military control .... ""
A prisoner serving consecutive sentences is regarded as being "in custody"
under any of them and may attack the validity of the sentence he will
serve in the future as well as the one he is currently serving.'7 Aliens
seeking entry into the United States' 8 and state prisoners placed on parole
under the custody and control of parole boards 9 are proper parties to seek
habeas corpus relief. The writ even applies to restraints placed on people
in lawful custody. A prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief when "he
is deprived of some right to which he is lawfully entitled even in his con-
finement, the deprivation of which serves to make his imprisonment more
burdensome than the law allows or curtails his liberty to a greater extent
than the law permits."'  As a consequence, habeas corpus can inquire in-
to the lawfulness of an added punishment even though the inquiry will
not result in the petitioner's unconditional release from prison. The writ's
mandate with respect to the relief that may be granted is quite broad due
to the language of the appropriate statutes that provide in one place that
the petitioned courts shall "dispose of the matter as law and justice re-
128 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (4) (1970).
1228 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970).
13 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968).
'4 Hicks v. Michigan, 281 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1960).
'
5 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
16Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571 (1885).
'7Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
18Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
19 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
20 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
quire"'" and in another that the courts can order "release from custody or
other remedy. 22
In recent years, state and federal prisoners have been urging their vari-
ous types of petitions upon federal district courts in mounting quantities.
There were nearly 16,000 such filings in 1970, up 635 percent over 1960,
while other civil filings increased only 47 percent during the same peri-
od.23  From 1962 to 1970, habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners in-
creased by at least 1000 per year, reaching 9,063 in 1970. In 1971, how-
ever, they dropped to 8,372, a 7.6 percent decrease. This decrease may be
based on the fact that in 96 percent of the prisoner cases, the relief prayed
for has not been granted. Thus there may be a spreading acceptance by
prisoners of the futility of pressing unfounded or trivial claims.24
Though the burden of habeas corpus petitions represents only a small
fraction of the total number of civil and criminal actions commenced each
year in federal district courts,25 it would be impossible to justify the ex-
penditure of judicial time and energy to grant the writ and hold a hearing
as a matter of course in every case. The lives, liberty, and property of all
the other federal litigants simply cannot wait upon the hearing of peti-
tions which are obviously lacking in merit. On the other hand, petitions
for habeas corpus ought not to be viewed with too jaundiced an eye and
held to artificial pleading standards designed only to frustrate petitioners.
Underlying many summary dismissals of petitions there seems to be a ju-
'dicial assumption that all convicted prisoners are in fact guilty and that
prisoner allegations should be automatically suspect. One eminent jurist
has recently lamented that "[a]fter trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, af-
firmance, and denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, in proceedings
where the defendant had the assistance of counsel at every step, the crim-
inal process . . . has not reached the end, or even the beginning of the
end, but only the end of the beginning. ''2 0  Since the habeas corpus pro-
cess does in many respects challenge the efficacy of the entire judicial pro-
cess, it is quite understandable why courts who are drowning in new cases
may be inclined to resist attacks on apparently complete adjudications by,
for example, requiring that applications for the writ meet strict and shad-
owy standards of pleading.
It is to this last mentioned manifestation of judicial hostility to the writ
2128 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
=28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970).
231970 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMtISTRATiVE OFvici; or THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 118 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
24 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 132.
25 There were 134,686 civil and criminal filings in federal district court during fiscl year
1971, up seven percent from 1970. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 114.
20 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. CHI. L. RBv. 142 (1970). Circuit Judge
Friendly's thesis was that convictions should be subject to collaterel attack only when the pris-
oner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence.
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that this note is directed. In order to discuss the standards by which fed-
eral courts do and should pass upon the flood of habeas corpus applica-
tions, the text has been organized in the following manner: Section I deals
with the relation of the habeas corpus procedure to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure; section II attempts to briefly list the numerous require-
ments of a complete petition; and section III discusses the way courts are
expected to act upon the petitions presented to them.
I. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Because habeas corpus is brought to assert the civil right of liberty,
courts have commonly characterized it as a civil proceeding.2 7 As a conse-
quence, it has not been held that there is a constitutional obligation on the
courts to appoint counsel for prisoners who indicate that they wish post
conviction relief, s and in most federal courts it is the practice to appoint
counsel only after a petition has passed initial judicial evaluation and the
court has determined that issues are presented which call for an eviden-
tiary hearing.' Likewise, during the habeas corpus hearing, the requisite
standard of proof that the petitioner must meet is the civil "preponderance
of the evidence."3  Recently, however, it has been recognized that the
civil label is gross and inexact, for the habeas corpus proceeding is in real-
ity unique and has conformed in the federal courts with civil practice only
in a general sense.31
Rule 1 of -the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the rules
govern the procedure in district courts in all suits of a civil nature "with
the exceptions stated in Rule 81." Rule 81 (a) (2) provides that the rules
are applicable to habeas corpus proceedings "to the extent that the practice
in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has
heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions." Prior to 1968, Rule
81 (a) (2) provided, in relevant part, that the Federal Rules were inappli-
cable to habeas corpus "except to the extent that the practice in such pro-
ceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has hereto-
fore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity." It is
generally understood that the present wording of the rule, which became
effective July 1, 1968, was not intended to change matters as they stood
before the amendment. The total amendment merely eliminated refer-
27 See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963).
28 See, e.g., Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 US. 996
(1966); Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964).
29 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
3 0 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,286 (1941).
3 1 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969).
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ences to appellate procedure made inappropriate by the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.32
The meaning of Rule 81 (a) (2) is somewhat cryptic, and courts have
applied the individual rules to habeas corpus proceedings by paying closer
attention to policy considerations than to the language of the rule.88 For
example, one district court has held that the habeas corpus pleadings
should be limited to those specified in Rule 7 (a).34 Another has held that
the Rule 8(a) requirement that a complaint contain "a short plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" was appli-
cable to habeas corpus and, consequently, dismissed a 2000 page petition
for being "prolix and redundant. 'a3 The Supreme Court has maintained
that the concern of the rule's draftsmen was to provide for the continuing
applicability of the Federal Rules to those areas of practice in habeas cor-
pus in which it had theretofore utilized the modes of civil practice. Other-
wise, except by appropriate application by analogy, habeas corpus was
considered outside the scope of the rules. What evidence there was with
respect to the intent of the draftsmen indicated to the Supreme Court
"nothing more than a general and nonspecific understanding that the
rules would have very limited application to habeas corpus proceedings."8 0
The Federal Rules have been interpreted so that the claimant is not
required to set out in great detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.87
All that is required in a complaint is a short, plain statement that will give
the other party fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests. While it would be inaccurate to characterize this as mere "notice"
pleading, it is clear that the Federal Rules have rejected the approach that
one misstep in the pleadings may be decisive to the outcome. Habeas
corpus pleading, on the other hand, is generally considered to require "some
particularity of pleading beyond that normally necessary in other civil
cases . 8..."21 Whatever the outcome of the debate over whether the Fed-
eral Rules sanction mere notice in the petition or complaint, it is clear be-
yond doubt that the habeas corpus petition may not be in the form of bare
notice pleading."0 This apparent departure from the spirit of the Federal
Rules has been justified on the ground that, "Habeas corpus is a special
proceeding to right wrongs, not a routine procedure to search for them,
321. at 293 n.3.
33 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1021 (1969).
34Pappas v. Buchkow, 156 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Mich. 1957).
35Passic v. State, 98 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
36 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1969).
37Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).38 United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 249 F.2d 417, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1957).
29 United States ex rel. Bagley v. La Vallee, 209 F. Supp. 529, 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd,
332 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1964).
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nor a means of requiring the federal courts to review, as a matter of
course, state proceedings."4
II. FoRMAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
The formal prerequisites of a complete application for the writ are in-
terspersed throughout sections 2241 to 2255 of the Judicial Code of 1948
and judicial opinions. What follows is an attempt to briefly list all of the
elements of a habeas corpus application to which a federal court could
raise no objection as to completeness.
A. Writing, Signature, and Verification
An application must "be in writing signed and verified by the person for
whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf."'1 While
it is recognized that a person has the right to petition for the writ in order
to secure the release of another, the right exists only when the application
sets forth some reason or explanation satisfactory to the court showing
why the detained person does not sign and verify the petition himself and
telling who the next friend applicant is. It was not intended that the writ
should be availed of, as a matter of course, by intruders and uninvited
meddlers.42 The practice of a next friend applying for the writ is, never-
theless, fully accepted in cases where it may not be possible or feasible for
the detained person to sign and verify his own application. Examples of
such cases would be when the detained person does not understand En-
glish or is mentally or legally incompetent.
The requirement of verification means that an affidavit must be ap-
pended to the end of the application to the effect that the person making
it knows, or to the extent stated is informed and believes, that the mat-
ters contained in the application are true 3 At least one district court has
held that it could consider the application even though it was not so veri-
fied.44
B. Addressed to the Proper Court
Federal district courts have only such jurisdiction as Congress, by stat-
ute, has conferred upon them and this is true with regard to jurisdiction
to grant petitions for writs of habeas corpus.rY Congress has authorized
that writs of habeas corpus "may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respec-
40 Bemier v. Moore, 441 F.2d 395, 396 (1st Cir. 1971).
4128 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
42 Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U.S. 81 (1901).
43 D. LotriSELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PRocEmuR 119 (2d ed. 1968).
44 Lewis v. Connett, 291 F. Supp. 583, 585 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
45 Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1966).
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tive jurisdictions." '46 However, Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires that an application for the writ be made to the appro-
priate district court, and if made to a circuit judge the application will
ordinarily be transferred to the appropriate district court. Petitions ad-
dressed to circuit judges are discouraged for a circuit judge who unneces-
sarily entertains applications thereby disqualifies himself to hear such
matters on appeal and to that extent limits his usefulness as an appellate
judge. Where there are special circumstances making immediate action
by a circuit court or the Supreme Court necessary or expedient, the applica-
tion must state what these special circumstances are for not making appli-
cation to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held.4"
When made in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to a state court
judgment of a state which contains more than one federal judicial district,
the application may be made to either the district court in the district in
which the applicant is held or in the district in which he was tried.4"
C. Allegations Pertaining to Custody
Because the petitioned court's jurisdiction depends on the fact of the
petitioner's custody, the petition must "allege the facts concerning the ap-
plicant's commitment or detention, the name of the person who has cus-
tody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known." 0 This
requirement can be satisfied, for example, by a statement that the petitioner
is in prison, the name of the warden, and a description of the crime and
sentence. The Supreme Court has held "that if the detention is claimed
to be unlawful by reason of the invalidity of the process or proceedings un-
der which the party is held in custody, copies of such process or proceed-
ings must be annexed to or the essential parts thereof set out in the peti-
tion ... 1 Thus, in the case of a prisoner attacking the sufficiency of
the indictment, sentence, commitment and verdict in his prosecution, he
should attach copies of each or the essential parts of each record. Other-
wise, the petition may be deemed insufficient. If the petitioner does not
know by what authority he is being detained, he should state this fact0
and if he is unable to append the record as required he should likewise
explain the omission.13
The cost of providing these records would act as a screen for prospec-
tive applicants except for provisions in the Judicial Code which make al-
4628 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1970).
4 7 H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A178 (1947).
4828 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
4928 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (1970).
5028 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
51 Craemer v. Washington, 168 U.S. 114, 128-29 (1897).
52 Cuddy's case, 131 U.S. 280 (1889).
53 Hon Moon Ong v. Nagle, 32 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1929).
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lowance for indigents. If a federal prisoner fails to attach copies of the
requisite records to his application, the respondent custodian must attach
such materials to his return to the writ or to his answer to show cause.5'
If an applicant has been permitted to prosecute his application in forma
pauperis,"5 then the court clerk, on the order of the judge before whom
the application is pending, will furnish the petitioner, without cost, copies
of such documents as the judge thinks are required for his application."
When a state applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced
in his state court proceeding, the state can be required to produce the rele-
vant portion of the record on direction from the petitioned federal court5
D. Allegations Pertaining to the Illegality of the Restraint
The application must allege that the petitioner is unlawfully restrained
of his liberty and show precisely the alleged illegality of restraint by stat-
ing the pertinent facts in such a manner as to make possible an intelligent
judgment by the court upon the question."8 Unless the allegation is very
simple, such as denial of the right to counsel, the petition should consist
of direct averments of "ultimate facts," as distinguished from "conclusions
of law." 9  Neither the petitioner's "naked assertion, without any back-
ground factual substantiation whatsoever,"' nor his bare allegation of con-
finement6' afford the court an adequate basis to order a hearing. The
mere assertion that the petitioner had ineffective counsel, for example,
54 28 U.S.C. § 2249 (1970).
55 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
5628 U.S.C. § 2250 (1970).
5728 U.S.C § 2254(e) (1970).
5 8 Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 242 (1895).
5 9 Craemer v. Washington, 168 U.S. 124 (1897). At common law, the theory developed
that the purpose of pleading was to isolate and formulate the issues and, as a consequence, the
rules of pleading became limited and rigid to an infamously absurd degree. After 1848, the
Field Code began to gain acceptance among the states as a step in the direction of flexibility,
but the courts, by strict enforcement, managed to hamper the reform movement by requiring
among other things that the pleaders state "facts" rather than "conclusions." When the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were being drafted, the drafters concluded that such distinctions
were useless in light of the logical impossibility of making distinctions between such concepts
as "ultimate facts," evidence, and "conclusions." Consequently, the Federal Rules only require
that the complaint contain "a short and p!ain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief' and courts are required to construe pleadings so "as to do substantial justim."
See FED. R. CIM. P. 8. As previously shown, see text accompanying notes 27 through 40 supra,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not generally apply to habeas corpus pleading. This,
no doubt, accounts for the continued applicability of some of the old code pleading concepts.
On this whole subject generally, see, e.g., Weinstein and Distler, Comments on Procedural Re-
form: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUm. L. REV. 518 (1957); Cook, "Facts" and "Stale'
ments of Fact," U. CH L REv. 233 (1937). Though the cite to Craemer dates back to before
the adoption of the Federal Rules, modern decisions tend to emp!oy similar old-fashioned lan.
guage. See, e.g., Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1970); Gray v. Wingo, 391
F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir. 1957).
6 0 Midgett v. Warden, 329 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1964).
811 Murray v. Radauskas, 229 F. Supp. 561, 562 (D. Md. 1964).
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would not suffice. If he knows that his counsel is guilty of some miscon-
duct amounting to the denial of petitioner's constitutional rights, he must
inform the court of the factual basis for this conclusion. If he fails to do
this, "then his recitation of standard claims and stock phrases will not be
regarded an adequate claim for habeas corpus relief."'0 2  Likewise, a gen-
eral allegation that the petitioner is detained in violation of the federal
constitution or laws is insufficient, for this is regarded as a mere conclusion
of law. S
F. Allegations Pertaining to Exhaustion of Remedies
It is commonly stated that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be made a
substitute for an appeal or a writ of error." This requirement is codified
in section 2254 of the Judicial Code which provides that a writ shall not
be granted unless it appears that the petitioner has either exhausted avail-
able state remedies, there is no available state corrective process, or such
process is ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights. This requirement
is an accommodation of the federal system designed to give the state an
initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its pris-
oner's federal rights.65 Petitioners are, consequently, not required to file
repetitious applications in the state courts 0 and the mere possibility of suc-
cess in additional proceedings does not bar federal relief. 7 The substance
of the federal habeas corpus claim must in the first instance be fairly pre-
sented to the state courts and if those courts have not had fair opportunity
to consider and act upon the petitioner's claim, he has not exhausted his
state remedies. "8 The state remedies are exhausted when the constitutional
question has been presented once to the state courts."" Prior to 1963, the
petitioner had to also appeal or make application to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari to review the state decision, but this requirement
was found to be unjustifiable. 0 A judgment by the Supreme Court on an
appeal or certiorari, however, shall be conclusive as to all issues of fact or
law actually adjudicated by the Court.7
Consequently, the habeas corpus application should state precisely what
remedies were pursued in the state courts and should give citations to any
published opinions involving the case. If state remedies are not ex-
6 2 Bernier v. Moore, 441 F.2d 395, 396 (1st Cir. 1971).
SKohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895).
64 Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849 (1960).
65 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
06Brown v. Alien, 344 U.S. 443, 449 n.3 (1953).
67 Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1967).
68 Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
69 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
7DFay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7128 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970).
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hausted, the petitioner must set forth in detail the special reasons which
would justify the federal court's intervention to protect his constitutional
rights.71 If the issues the petitioner is raising have already been decided
once by the Supreme Court, he must plead and the district court must find
the existence of a controlling fact not presented to the Court and which
could not have been presented by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
The federal courts have the power to grant relief despite the petitioner's
failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him at the time he
applies for habeas corpus.74 The doctrine that a state procedural default is
an adequate and independent state law ground barring direct review in
the Supreme Court does not limit the power of the district court to grant
a petitioner relief despite his failure to make a timely appeal of his convic-
tion, provided that the decision not to appeal was not a deliberate bypassing
of the state court system.'
Just as state prisoners have to exhaust their state remedies before ha-
beas corpus becomes available to them, federal prisoners should be aware
that habeas corpus is not a substitute for a motion pursuant to section 2255
of the Judicial Code. This statute provides that a prisoner in custody un-
der sentence of a federal court who claims the right to be released because
his sentence either violates federal law, the court lacked jurisdiction, the
sentence was excessive, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. The
purpose of section 2255 is to require a federal prisoner to exhaust his rem-
edies in the courts of the district and circuit in which he was convicted
and sentenced, and to apply to the Supreme Court, on certiorari from a
denial of such remedies, before seeking release on habeas corpusY6 An
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of one authorized to use
the section 2255 procedure shall not be entertained unless it appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.77  As a general proposition, the instances in which habeas cor-
pus is available to a federal prisoner are exceptional and usually confined
to situations where there is peculiar and pressing need for it or where the
72 See United States v. Cavell, 151 F. Supp. 675, 677 (W.D. Pa. 1957); P. SOKOL, FED-
ERAL HABEAS CoRPus § 9 (1969).
7-28 U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1970).
74 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
75 Id.
76 Weber v. Steele, 185 F.2d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 1950). In 1970, about 1,600 federal
prisoners filed petitions for the writ of habeas corpus in federal district courts. 1970 ANNUAL
REPORT 121. Prisoners in custody under sentence of a federal court, rather than using habeas
corpus, normally use a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to § 2255 of the Judicial Code. The
reason for this is discussed in the above text. Section 2255 attempts to restate the procedure
in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis and provides an expeditious remedy for
correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus. I.. REP. No. 308. 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. A180 (1947).
-7 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
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process or judgment under which the prisoner is held is wholly void."
When pleading that the section 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective,
the applicant must also specifically relate the inadequacy or ineffectiveness
to a procedural deficiency."9
The unavailability of the writ of habeas corpus to federal prisoners is
amplified by the rule that the mere fact that relief under section 2255 has
been denied on the merits on a prior occasion does not render the motion
remedy inadequate or ineffective so as to allow resort to habeas corpus.80
Similarly, distance from the sentencing court does not render the remedy
inadequate or ineffective"1 and the motion for relief may be made at any
time.
F. Allegations Pertaining to Prior Applications
Though res judicata does not apply to habeas corpus cases,82 district
and circuit judges are not required to entertain an application if the legality
of the petitioner's detention has already been determined by a federal court
on a prior habeas corpus application and the present application presents
no new ground for inquiry. 3 An applicant who has had a prior petition
dismissed on its merits needs to allege a factual ground for release that
was not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application and needs to
plead sufficient facts to assure the court that he did not deliberately with-
hold the newly asserted ground in the earlier application.8 4  The rationale
for this is that where there have been repeated petitions, the onus may
properly be cast on the applicant of satisfying the court that an abusive use
is not being made of the writ. The statute setting forth this requirement "
is designed to eliminate repetitive assertions of identical claims and draw-
ing out of litigation by deliberate presentation of claims in bits and
pieces.8 6  However, since the primary purpose of the habeas corpus pro-
ceeding is to insure that people are not unjustly imprisoned, if for some
justifiable reason the petitioner was previously unable to assert his rights or
was unaware of the significance of relevant facts, then it is neither neces-
sary nor reasonable to deny him an opportunity of obtaining judicial re-
lief.81 It should be enough that the petitioner presents an allegation and
supporting facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief. It is then up
7 8 Gotto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1924).
7 9 Cain v. Markley, 347 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1965).
8 0 Burchfield v. United States, 296 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1961).
8 lMachibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
8 2 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
8328 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (1970).
8428 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970).
8528 U.S.C. § 2244 (1970).
s6 Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cif. 1969).
87 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
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to the government in its return to raise the allegation that the petitioner has
abused the writ. Once this has been alleged, then the petitioner must an-
swer the allegation and if his answer is inadequate the court can dismiss
the petition. If there is substantial conflict, a hearing may be necessary3
G. Compliance with Local Rules
Finally, relying on section 2071 of the Judicial Codep and Rule 83 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 federal district courts have been
adopting local rules setting forth additional requirements of a petition
which must be carefully checked by a prospective applicant. One of the
most common of these rules is the requirement that applications be sub-
mitted on court-provided forms. In cases where petitioners insist on mail-
ing in their handwritten applications despite the local rules requiring use
of a specified form, the court can dismiss the petition without a hearing.°
This development has been defended on the ground that the volume of
petitions does not permit a "search for merit in every layman's narrative
of grievance prepared in the traditional prison style."92  While there is
much substance to the argument that a judge's time must be efficiently
used, unless erring petitioners are immediately provided with the correct
form and forms are easy to understand and are easily available to all
prospective applicants, forced compliance with such a rule merely becomes
an expedient method of frustrating a disfavored remedy.
III. ACTING ON THE PETITION
An application for the writ "usurps the attention and displaces the cal-
endar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives prompt action
from him within the four comers of the application."9 13  Habeas corpus
can, therefore, be described as an "extraordinary, summary and emerg-
ency remedy"94 even though it is also a remedy available to a petitioner ir-
respective of the length of time that has elapsed since his trial."
When a petition is filed in a district court, that court is required to
88d. Price was decided shortly before the enactment of § 2244 of the Judicial Code, but
this section was not intended to change the law as it had judicially evolved. Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 11 (1963).
8 9 This provides that federal courts may prescribe rules for the conduct of their business so
long as they are consistent with acts of Congress and rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
9
oThis provides that each district court may, by action of a majority of the judges within
the district, make and amend rules governing its practice so long as they are not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
91 United States ex tel. Wilson v. Maroney, 395 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1968).
9 2 Hooker v. United States District Court, 380 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1967).
9 3Ruby v. United States, 341 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 979
(1966).
94 Id.
9 5 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).
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either "forthwith award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent
to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from
the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled there-
to."9  This means that there are only four immediate choices open to a
court upon receiving an application for the writ. First, if upon the face of
the petition it appears that the petitioner is not entitled to the writ, the
court can dismiss the petition summarily. Second, if the petition is insuf-
ficient in substance, the court can issue an order to the petitioner requiring
him to amend or supplement it.0 7  Third, if the allegations are merely in-
conclusive, the court can issue an order to the custodian of the petitioner,
who is called the "respondent," to show cause why the writ should not be
granted. Finally, the court can simply issue the writ and hold a hearing
on the petitioner's allegations.
If the latter course is taken, the writ will be directed to the respondent
who will then be required to make a return certifying the true cause of the
petitioner's detention. When this return is made, which must be within
three days unless the respondent shows good cause for allowing more
time,"8 the court will set a day for a hearing. Unless only issues of law are
presented, the person to whom the writ is directed must produce the de-
tained person at the hearing. The court must then "hear and determine
the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.""
If the petition is not summarily dismissed or ordered amended, the most
likely course of action for the court to take is to issue an order directing
the petitioner's custodian to show cause why the writ should not be
granted. This order requires the respondent to make an answer explaining
the true cause of detention. If this procedure is followed, the facts on
which the opposing parties rely can be exhibited to the judge and if he
finds that no issue of fact or law is involved he may then refuse to grant
the writ, in which event it is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing.00
If an issue of fact is presented, the court must issue the writ and hold a
hearing at which evidence is received. 1' It is also possible that the facts
admitted in response to the order to show cause entitle the petitioner to an
immediate discharge as a matter of law.1°2
In Townsend v. Sain'03 the Supreme Court held that where an appli-
96 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
97 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
98 FED. R. CIV. P. 81 (a) (2).
9928 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
100 Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 866 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S, 890 (1945).
By "issues of fact" it is meant basic, primary, or historic facts; facts "in the sense of a recital of
external events and the credibility of their narrators." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506
(1953).
101 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941).
1o2 Id. at 284.
103 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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cant alleges facts which, if proved, would entitle him to relief, the federal
court has the power to hold an evidentiary hearing. But where the facts
are in dispute, the federal court must hold such a hearing if the applicant
did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in -. state court, either at
trial or in a collateral proceeding. The Court went on to particularize
the test for determining whether the state court trier of fact has after a full
and fair hearing reliably found the relevant facts. Thus a hearing has to
be held in the following circumstances:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hear-
ing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the rec-
ord as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed in the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas ap-
plicant a full and fair fact hearing.'04
In 1966, Congress amended sections 2244 and 2254 of the Judicial Code
in what has been characterized as an attempt to codify the principles estab-
lished in the Townsend decision and two other cases decided by the Court
in 1963.1"5 The amendment to section 2254 provides that the state court
determination of a factual issue shall be presumed correct unless the habe-
as corpus applicant establishes, the respondent admits, or it otherwise be-
comes apparent that any of eight listed conclusions about the state hearing
are true.'"6 While the Townsend criteria quoted above and the statutory
criteria are not exactly the same, it has been concluded that the intent of the
amendment was only to make the rules stated in the case better under-
stood.' 7  Therefore, the practices announced in Townsend were not
changed.
It has been held by at least one circuit court that an application omit-
ting any of the essential pleading requirements listed earlier in the text
fails to establish a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ."0 ' It does
not necessarily follow, however, that a petition must be dismissed because
of a failure to comply with the precise niceties of technical procedure.'l
Not only can the petition be amended or supplemented,' but if any es-
104Id, at 313.
105 These other two decisions are Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) and Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
10628 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).
107'White v. Swenson, 261 F. Supp. 42, 61 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
10sDorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945).
The term "prima facie" is usually used in the context of such evidence as is sufficient to establish
a given fact until contradicted by the other party. The court in Dorfey evidently meant that at
petition which contains all the requirements is sufficient to support issuance of the writ unless
the respondent can rebut the applicanes well-pleaded allegations.
109 Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
110 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1970).
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sential item has been omitted, the defect may be cured by information ap-
pearing in the record under the rule that the application consists of both
the petition and facts of which the court is required to take judicial no-
tice.11'
The Supreme Court has encouraged a liberal interpretation of peti-
tions by saying that a judge should be alert to examine facts for himself
which, if true, would make the trial absolutely void'12 and for this purpose
:the petition should not be scrutinized with technical nicety"' or the duty
discharged as a matter of mere routine.14  The Court's observation that,
"Meticulous insistence upon regularity in procedural allegations is foreign
to the purpose of habeas corpus"' "5 is quite consistent with the Rule 8(f)
declaration that all pleadings drafted pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are to be so construed as to do substantial justice.
More than simple facts are needed in order to file an adequate petition,
and an applicant needs to know rules about venue, jurisdiction, exhaus-
tion of remedies, and proper parties respondent. Equally important, he
needs to know which facts are legally significant and which are irrelevant.
The Court recognized the importance of such legal expertise when it held
that in the absence of some state provision for a reasonable alternative to
assist illiterate or poorly educated inmates in preparing petitions, the state
could not enforce a regulation absolutely barring inmates from furnishing
legal assistance to other prisoners." 0 The Court has also held that federal
judges cannot impose upon prisoners "the same high standards of the legal
art which we might place on the members of the legal profession."",
One practical consequence of such a holding is that the lower courts have
tried not to be overly concerned with such mundane matters as the title
given to the documents filed with them by prisoners." 8
A liberal construction of a petition would have the judge look at the
petition by the simple test of whether facts are alleged in it that entitle the
applicant to relief." 9 This does not mean that courts are compelled to
blindly accept all allegations in the petition as presumptively valid. The
petitioned court need not accept allegations which the record reveals are
untrue or "patently unbelievable."' 20
11 Anderson v. Treat, 172 U.S. 25 (1898).
112 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"3 Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 350 (1941).
1 4 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
"1 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 779 (1949).
116 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
11 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).
118 Chapman v. Texas, 242 F. Supp. 378, 381 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
119 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
120 Edge v. Wainwright, 347 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1965), ca.m den;ed, 385 U.S. 953
(1966).
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IV. CONCLUSION
It should be questioned whether courts should make a distinction be-
tween layman-drawn and lawyer-drawn petitions. That a petitioner should
not suffer for his own mistakes, but should suffer for those of his lawyer
is not a logically compelling notion. Furthermore, it should be remem-
bered that if a petition is dismissed because incompletely drafted, the dis-
missal cannot be on the merits. This means that the petitioner will be
allowed to submit a subsequent petition which, unless the petitioner is in-
structed as to why his first petition failed, is not likely to be remarkably
superior to the first. Thus the court will be required to strictly construe
two petitions rather than just one. This predicament could be avoided
by an order to amend which explicitly tells the petitioner what information
needs to be included in the petition to allow consideration on the merits.
When the court finally gets down to the merits, only then will it be prop-
erly and productively disposing of the petition. It is not doubted that the
district courts have the power to dismiss the incomplete petition,12 only
that such power should always be exercised.
Requiring amendment of insufficient petitions is also the course most
consistent with the nature and scope of the writ. After all, habeas cor-
pus is not "a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to
achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of
their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty."'12- The
court should use pleading standards only as a vehicle for getting to the
ultimate question of whether the petitioner's liberty is unduly restricted.
To rely on procedural rules as a means to another end, such as quick dis-
missal of burdensome applications without a consideration of the merits,
not only violates the purpose of the writ, but also does not in reality ease
the burden. Justice Jackson thought that the Supreme Court had sanc-
tioned "triviization" of the writ to the point that a flow of stale, frivo-
lous and repetitious petitions have now inundated the lower federal dock-
ets, prejudicing the occasional meritorious application buried in this flood.
He compared reviewing petitions to searching through a haystack for a
needle and he added that a judge is likely to conclude that the needle is
not really worth the search.'2 Nevertheless, the search must go on for, as
the Supreme Court has said, "[tQhere is no higher duty of a court... than
the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for the writs of habeas
corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that
error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement." 12
Charles J. Pruilt
121 Stephens v. United States, 246 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1957).
l=2 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
123 Brown v. Allen, 341 U.S. 443, 536-37 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
124 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 292 (1969).
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